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Abstract
Analogical reasoning involves the identification and transfer of an explanatory structure from a known
system (the source) to a new and relatively unknown system (the target). Analogical reasoning can
take place between two systems that belong to fundamentally different domains, or between two
systems that belong to the same or similar domains. An analogy can be identified when the underlying
structural similarity between two analogs is recognized. However, the productive use of an analogy,
that is, the use of analogical reasoning to produce a new understanding of the explanatory structure of
a target system, is often based on the recognition of some similarity in salient properties of the two
systems, and not on similarity in their structure, because the explanatory structure of the target system
is not known.
It seems that adults as well as children are capable of identifying the structural similarity between two
analogs when the similar underlying structure is part of their representation of the source and target
systems. They can also use the similarity in salient properties between two systems as a vehicle for
discovering similarities in their explanatory structure. What develops is not so much the analogical
mechanism itself but rather the conceptual system upon which this mechanism is based.
Analogical Reasoning - 2
ANALOGICAL REASONING AS A MECHANISM IN
KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION:
A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
Whether or not we talk of discovery or of invention, analogy's inevitable in human
thought, because we come to new things in science with what equipment we have,
which is how we have learned to think, and above all how we have learned to think
about the relatedness of things. We cannot, coming into something new, deal with it
except on the basis of the familiar and the old-fashioned. The conservation of
scientific enquiry is not an arbitrary thing; it is the freight with which we operate; it is
the only equipment we have. We cannot learn to be surprised or astonished at
something unless we have a view of how it ought to be; and that view is almost
certainly an analogy. (Oppenheimer, 1955, pp. 129-130.)
Interest in analogy has been generated to a large extent by a recognition of the role that analogy can
play in the acquisition of new knowledge. While our models of learning have stressed the importance
of prior knowledge in thinking, remembering and learning, they have remained mainly silent on the
processes thereby which new knowledge is acquired. One mechanism which has been recognized by
scientists, philosophers and psychologists alike as having the potential of bringing prior knowledge to
bear on the acquisition of, sometimes, radically new information is analogy.
My purpose in this paper is to examine analogical reasoning, paying particular attention to the role it
plays in knowledge acquisition. This question will be approached from a developmental point of view.
I will discuss how analogical reasoning is used by adults as well as by children and I will speculate about
how analogical reasoning may develop. The developmental questions are often ignored in our
treatment of analogy. Yet, they are critical both in order to understand the psychological processes
involved in analogical reasoning (see also Gentner, in press), and in terms of their implications for
learning and instruction. For it is only if we understand how analogical reasoning develops with age
and with the acquisition of expertise that we shall be able to influence its development.
The first section of this paper deals with the problem of "what" analogical reasoning is. It is argued that
analogical reasoning involves the identification and transfer of structural information from a known
system (the source) to a new and relatively unknown system (the target). Two different types of
reasoning are discussed and some of the psychological processes involved in their identification are
examined. It is concluded that the productive use of analogy, the use of analogy to produce new
knowledge about the explanatory structure of the target system, is often based on the recognition of
some similarity in salient properties of the two systems, and not on similarity in their structure, since
the relevant structure of the target system is not known.
In the second section, a distinction is drawn between uses of analogical reasoning which require that
the relevant structure is part of one's representation of the target and cases where analogical reasoning
can produce this knowledge. With respect to the developmental question, the main thesis of this paper
is that analogical reasoning is available to children. Like adults, children can identify the similarity in
the structure between two analogs when this structure is part of their representation of the source and
target systems. Moreover, it appears that children can use similarity in salient properties between two
systems as a vehicle for discovering structural similarities between them, just like adults do. It is
concluded that what develops is not the analogical mechanism itself but the conceptual system upon
which this mechanism operates.
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Analogical Reasoning: Definitional Issues
Mapping a Relational Structure
Two types of analogical reasoning. It is by now generally accepted that the process of reasoning by
analogy involves transfer of structural information from a source to a target system. This transfer of
knowledge is accomplished by mapping or matching processes which consist of finding the
correspondences between the two systems.
In most cases, an analogy is said to exist between two structures (concepts, theories, systems, stories,
etc.), which belong to fundamentally different or remote conceptual domains but which share a similar
relational structure (hereafter "between-domain" analogies). For example, the analogy between the
atom and the solar system is based on the similarity in the structure of the two systems. The particular
properties involved (e.g., sun-nucleus, electrons-planets) are very different. Similarly, in the analogy
between the "radiation problem" (Dunker, 1945) and the "fortress problem" (Gick & Holyoak, 1980,
1983; Holyoak & Thagard, in press), the particular properties involved (e.g., army and rays, fortress
and tumor) are very different. However, the goals, resources, and constraints of the two problems (i.e.,
structural aspects) are similar, and hence can be transferred from one problem to the other.
In other cases, analogical reasoning involves items which belong to the same or at least very close
conceptual domains, as in the case where "a styrofoam cup" is used as an example from which to reason
analogically about a "ceramic mug" described by Kedar-Cabelli (1985) (hereafter "within-domain"
analogies). The types of analogical reasoning described by Anderson and Thompson (in press) and
Ross (in press) involve mainly within-domain analogies.
The distinction between within-domain and between-domain analogies is not a dichotomous one.
Rather, it represents a continuum from comparisons involving items that are clear examples of the
same concept to items that belong to different and remote domains. In that respect, the distinction
between the two types of analogies is similar to the distinction between literal comparisons and
metaphorical comparisons (Ortony, 1979; Vosniadou, 1987a). The important point for the purposes of
this discussion is that analogical reasoning can be employed between items that belong anywhere in the
continuum from literal similarity to nonliteral similarity.
Can within-domain comparisons be analogies? Some theories of analogy consider within-domain
comparisons as literal similarities rather than as analogies. For example, Gentner (in press) believes
that within-domain comparisons are not analogies because they involve items which are similar in many
simple, descriptive, non-relational properties. Gentner draws a distinction between object attributes
(descriptive properties of objects, roughly expressed as one-place predicates) and relations (roughly
two-or-more place predicates) and argues that an analogy is defined by the presence of relational
similarity and the absence of similarity in object attributes. According to this view, in an analogy only
relational predicates are shared, while in literal similarity both relational predicates and object
attributes are shared.
Gentner is primarily concerned about characterizing static similarity statements of the sort "The solar
system is like an atom," rather than the process of reasoning by analogy. It is true that when it comes
to characterizing such similarity statements the distinction between a within-domain and a between-
domain comparison carries certain definitional implications. For instance, certain within-domain
similarity statements (such as "Puppies are like kittens") cannot be considered analogies (although an
analogy could be made out of some of these statements if the comparison were restricted to a
particular relation between the two items being compared, as in "Puppies are to dogs like kittens are to
cats"). Unlike similarity statements, however, the distinction between within-domain and between-
domain comparisons does not have any definitional implications when it comes to characterizing the
process of reasoning by analogy. Analogical reasoning can be employed between any two items that
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belong to the same fundamental category, if the reasoning involves transferring an explanatory
structure from one item to the other.
In the system described by Kedar-Cabelli (1985), for example, an analogy exists between a ceramic
mug and a styrofoam cup to the extent that the example of a ceramic mug can be used as a source from
which to determine whether the target satisfies a given goal (e.g., that of drinking hot liquids). Very
briefly, the analogy mechanism operates as follows:
1. The system retrieves a familiar source example (e.g., a ceramic mug) together with an
explanation of how this source example satisfies some goal (e.g., of drinking hot liquids).
2. The system maps the explanation derived from the source onto the target and attempts to
find out if this explanation is justified by the target example.
3. If the target example justifies the explanation, then it is concluded that it satisfies the goal
(i.e., it can be used to drink hot liquids).
Although the base and target systems in this case share many similar simple properties, the reasoning
process is analogical in nature because it rests on the mapping of an explanatory structure from the
source onto the target system to determine if the target satisfies it. The reasoning process is one of
mapping structural information.
Consider another example: Suppose we want to find out if there is a day/night cycle on the moon. If
we do not know the answer to this question directly, one way to answer it is to reason by analogy to the
earth. We know that there is a day/night cycle on the earth which is determined by the earth's rotation
around its axis. If we know that there is an axis rotation of the moon (or assume there is on the basis
of the other existing similarities between the moon and the earth), then we can come to the conclusion
that there must also be a day/night cycle on the moon.
Thus, while the statement, "The earth is like the moon" can hardly be thought of as an analogy, the
earth can nevertheless be used as a source from which to reason analogically about the moon. And,
despite the many simple properties that the earth and the moon share (solid, spherical, suspended,
rotating, etc.), it is only the causal relation between axis rotation and the existence of a day/night cycle
that is mapped from the base to the target.
To conclude, we have argued that domain incongruence (belonging to different conceptual domains) is
not a defining characteristic of analogy. The defining characteristic of analogy is similarity in
underlying structure. Structural similarity can be found between items that belong to different
conceptual domains as well as between items that belong to the same or similar domains. Domain
incongruence is, however, a defining characteristic of nonliteral (i.e., metaphorical) similarity. (See
Ortony, 1979; Tourangeau & Sternberg, 1982; Vosniadou, 1987a, for a more detailed discussion of this
issue.) The items juxtaposed in a metaphor must belong to different conceptual domains. This can be
shown by the fact that between-domain analogies can be turned into metaphors (e.g., "Atoms are Solar
Systems," "Inflation is Disease," "Illiteracy is Prison," and the like), but within-domain analogies (e.g.,
"A puppy is to a dog like a kitten is to a cat") cannot. The statement "A puppy is a kitten" is just
nonsense.
Identifying Similarity in Relational Structure
The role of "surface" similarity. The definition of analogical reasoning which I have offered focuses on
the mapping of an explanatory structure from a source to a target system, ignoring the question of
whether these two systems are similar in "surface" (simple, descriptive, non-analogy-related) properties
as well. Similarity in surface properties may be relevant, however, in determining how a source analog
is accessed in the first place. It could be argued, for example, that within-domain analogs can be
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identified on the basis of their similarity in simple, descriptive (and therefore easily accessible)
properties, which may not have anything to do with the analogy in the first place. Since between-
domain analogs do not share similarity in such non-analogy related surface properties, they can be
accessed only by noticing the similarity in their structure. This could be interpreted to mean that
different psychological processes operate in accessing a between-domain analogy than a within-domain
analogy. The argument I will advance in this paper is that while different psychological processes can
operate in accessing a between-domain analogy from a within-domain analogy, access to a productive
between-domain analogy (i.e., a between-domain analogy which provides new knowledge about the
explanatory structure of the target system) must be based on the same psychological process as access
to a within-domain analogy.
In support of the different psychological processes argument come the results of a number of
experiments which show that surface similarity (i.e., non-analogy-related similarity in simple,
descriptive properties of objects, like shape, color, size, names, profession, workplace of story
characters, kinds of animals, etc.) is likely to be noticed more easily than similarity in underlying
structure (e.g., Gentner & Landers, 1985; Holyoak & Koh, 1986; Vosniadou, Brown, & Bernstein, in
preparation). The easy accessibility of surface similarity sometimes becomes the motivating force for
selecting the wrong between-domain source analog (e.g., Ross, 1987).
These experiments have served an important purpose in showing that people are more sensitive to
similarity in descriptive properties than similarity in structural aspects. They have erred only in
allowing the inference that such a characteristic of the human reasoning system is an impediment to
analogical reasoning. Contrary to common sense expectations, similarity in descriptive properties of
objects is often analogy-related. As Medin and Ortony (in press) note, in our conceptual system,
descriptive properties of objects are usually related to deeper, less easily accessible properties in a
complex causal/relational network. In such a system, the easily accessible, descriptive properties which
are analogy-related can become the vehicle for discovering the similarity in the underlying structure
between two analogs. In fact, one of the reasons why people pay attention to "surface" similarities may
be that such similarities can lead to the discovery of an analogy in a non-accidental way (see also
Brown, in press, and Ross, in press). Being attentive to similarity in descriptive properties is thus one
of the characteristics that an efficient analogy mechanism should have.
Accessing a productive between-domain analog. It could be objected here that the possibility of
arriving at an analogy via similarity in the descriptive properties of two analogs can operate only in the
case of within-domain analogical reasoning. The absence of descriptive properties in between-domain
analogies necessitates that the identification of a between-domain analogy must be based on some
recognition of the structural similarity between the source and target domains.
Obviously, between-domain analogies can be accessed by recognizing the similarity in their underlying
structure. The problem with this account of access is that it fails to explain how between-domain
analogies can ever be used productively. As Hesse (1966) correctly observes, in order for an analogy to
be used productively, that is, to lead to the discovery of new knowledge, it cannot be based on the
recognition of the structural similarity between the two analogs. The reason is that understanding that
two systems have the same structure presupposes that one has a theory not only about the source but
also about the target system. If a theory about the target is not available, as must be the case for an
analogy to be used productively, then one is not likely to understand that the two systems have a similar
structure.
In such cases the access problem can be solved if we assume that the between-domain analogy is
identified on the basis of some similarity in easily accessible properties of the two systems, just like in
the case of many within-domain analogies. This argument rests on the presupposition that easily
accessible similarity does not need to be similar in descriptive properties. Rather, it can be similarity in
relational, abstract or conceptual properties for as long as these properties are salient with respect to
people's underlying representations. This is why I shall use the term salient similarity to distinguish it
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from surface similarity (the differences between these two kinds of similarity will be discussed further
in the next section). Such salient similarity can become the vehicle for discovering the presence of
other less easily accessible similarities and eventually the crucial structural correspondences between
the two systems.2
An access process of this sort can be traced in the discovery of a number of scientific analogies, like the
analogy between elastic balls and the behavior of gasses which apparently suggested itself because of
the similarity in the behavior of bouncing balls and balloons and the effects of pressure on a surface
due to expanding gas. Another example is the analogy between light and particles made by Newton.
This analogy appears to be based on the observation that light is reflected when it hits a surface the
same way that particles bounce back when they hit a surface. Properties such as the behavior of
particles and the behavior of light may appear to the layman to be remote and inaccessible. Yet to the
physicist working in the context of a certain theory they appear to be as real and easily observable as it
is to us the solid nature and spherical shape of the earth and the moon.
Surface Similarity vs. Salient Similarity
The access process for the productive use of between domain analogies which I have proposed requires
some modification of currently accepted notions regarding easily accessible similarity. It has been
assumed that what is easy to access is surface similarity and that surface similarity is either perceptual
similarity (Rips, in press) or similarity in object attributes (Gentner, in press). In this section I shall
argue that similarity which is easy to access (i.e, salient similarity) can be of a perceptual or conceptual
nature, similarity in descriptive or relational properties. What matters is only the status that these
properties have with respect to people's underlying representations.
Similarity in object attributes. In her work, Gentner has drawn a distinction between object attributes
(simple, descriptive properties of objects) and relations (complex, relational properties of objects), and
has argued that the latter are more difficult to access than the former. However, while descriptive
properties of objects are often easy to access, this is not always the case. Take, for instance, the
analogy between the earth and the moon discussed earlier. One may think that the similarity in object
attributes like solid and spherical which the earth and the moon share should be easily accessible.
Using the earth as a source analog from which to reason about the moon may thus be considered
rather trivial. Yet, most children in our studies of knowledge acquisition in astronomy (Vosniadou,
1987b; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987a), would never use the earth as a source analog from which to
reason about the moon, although adults would. The reason is that until the end of the elementary
school years many children do not really believe that the earth is a round sphere. Children's
phenomenal experience that the earth is flat is so strong that information coming from adult sources
regarding the shape of the earth is consistently misinterpreted. Furthermore, many children do not
know that the moon is spherical either. Many believe that the moon is shaped like a crescent or that it
is circular but flat, like a disc. It is apparent from the above, that the characterization of "spherical" as
an object attribute of the earth and the moon carries no implications as to whether this is an easily
accessible property of the objects in question or not.
The argument that descriptive properties of objects are more easily accessible than relational
properties fails to take into consideration the status that this information has in people's underlying
representations. Since similarity judgments can only be made with respect to people's underlying
representations, it would be impossible to see similarity between analogs whose representations do not
include these similar properties, or in which these properties are not salient. Just because a property is
described as an object attribute does not necessarily mean that it is present in people's representation
of that object or that it is an easily accessible property. Similarly, describing a property as relational
does not imply that it is not included in people's representations or that it is not salient.
In fact, some developmental research indicates that relational properties of objects may be particularly
salient even for young children. For instance, metaphor comprehension studies indicate that children
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find it easier to see similarity between moving objects belonging to different conceptual domains (like a
ballerina dancing and a top spinning), than between stationary objects with similar object properties
(like a curvy river and a curvy snake--see Dent, 1984; Calhoun, 1984). Our studies of children's
knowledge about the sun and the moon also show that children are very sensitive to the movement of
these objects across the sky.
Perceptual similarity. Defining easily accessible similarity as perceptual similarity is also problematic.
As Smith (in press) argues the perception of similarity is not something static and well-defined, but
something that changes with development (see also Piaget, 1969). What we perceive as similar at the
time of birth is presumably determined by constraints on our perceptual apparatus. However, this
"perceptual" similarity develops and changes with age and the acquisition of expertise. Moreover, going
beyond what may be considered as perceptual, developments in people's representations of concepts
allow them to have easy access to information which may not be of a perceptual nature at all.
The above observations suggest that easily accessible similarity does not have to be perceptual
similarity or similarity in object attributes. Rather, both descriptive and relational properties of objects
can be easy or difficult to access depending on how salient these properties are with respect to people's
underlying representations.
Finally, it appears that what constitutes salient similarity may change in the process of knowledge
acquisition. The results of a number of developmental and expert/novice studies show that older
children's similarity judgments are different from those of younger children (e.g., Carey, 1985b; Keil, in
press), or that experts categorize problems differently from novices (Chi, Feltovich, & Glasser, 1981).
As Chi et al. (1981) have argued, there are fundamental differences in the representations of physics
problems employed by experts and novices. Because of such differences, "experts are able to see the
underlying similarities in a great number of problems, whereas novices see a variety of problems that
they consider to be dissimilar because the surface features are different" (Chi et al., 1981, p. 130).
Conclusions
The analogy mechanism I have described can be characterized as a mechanism thereby which a
problem about a target system (X) is solved by:
1. Retrieving a source system (Y) which is similar to X in some way.
2. Mapping a relational structure from Y to X.
3. Evaluating the applicability of this relational structure for X.
A distinction was made between the situation where X and Y represent examples of the same
fundamental concept and the situation where X and Y belong to different conceptual domains.
Although it is the latter type of analogy that has often been identified as the "true" case of analogical
reasoning, it is important to notice that the same mapping process operates in both cases. In both
cases a relational structure is mapped from the source to the target and its applicability is evaluated on
the basis of what is known about the target concept.
While in many instances a between-domain analogy can be identified on the basis of the structural
similarity between the analogs, the productive use of a between-domain analogy (i.e., its use for the
purpose of acquiring new knowledge about the explanatory structure of the target system) requires an
access mechanism similar to the one used to access a within-domain analogy. In both cases, access to a





In this section I will try to show how an analogy mechanism like the one described above is used, and
particularly, how it is used to acquire new knowledge. Examples will be drawn from research
describing adults' and children's abilities to reason analogically, and emphasis will be placed on how
analogical reasoning develops with age and expertise. Finally, a distinction will be drawn between two
cases where analogical reasoning can be used. The first is the situation where the employment of
analogical reasoning requires that the underlying structure shared between two analogs is present in
the subject's representation of both the source and target systems at the time when the analogy
problem is solved. The other is the situation where the relational structure needs to be present only in
one's representation of the source. Analogical reasoning can contribute most to the acquisition of new
knowledge in this latter case. Instructional uses of analogy, where the source analog is given, and cases
where similarity in explanatory structure is discovered on the basis of similarity in the salient properties
of two systems are some instances where analogical reasoning can lead to the acquisition of new
knowledge.
The Ability to Identify Similarity in Relational Structure
In most experimental investigations of analogical reasoning (e.g., the solution of four-term verbal or
pictorial analogies, the comprehension of analogies, the transfer of a solution from story A to story B),
the application of analogical reasoning is based on the identification of the structural similarity of the
two systems in the absence of any known similarity in easily accessible properties between them.
Take, for example, the situation where story A is followed by an analogous story B, and where A
contains some information which can be used to solve a problem about B (e.g., Brown, Kane, &
Echols, 1986; Gentner, in press; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983; Holyoak, Junn, & Billman, 1984; Ross,
1987; Vosniadou, Brown, & Bernstein, in preparation). In these situations one must identify the
similarity in the structure between the two stories and, on the basis of this similarity, transfer the
problem solution from story A to story B.
The results of a number of experiments employing this paradigm have shown that often the similarity
in the structure of two analogs is not identified, with the corresponding result that story A is not used
as a source analog for story B. However, in order to identify this structural similarity, the relevant
structure must be present in the subject's representation of stories A and B at the time when the
analogy problem needs to be solved. It has now become apparent that analogous stories (problems,
concepts, etc.) are not always represented at a level at which the underlying structural similarity is
preserved, and as a result analogical reasoning cannot be applied to them.
Sometimes these appropriate representations are not achieved because of lack of relevant knowledge.
This is often the case with children. At other times, the relevant relational structure could be inferred
from what exists in the knowledge base, but it is not.3 This creates the problem of "inert" knowledge
discussed by Bransford (in press) and Brown (in press). In general, it appears that when familiarity
with the target and source domains is high then the likelihood of achieving an appropriate
representation of the source and target system is increased (thus the observed differences in analogical
reasoning between adults and children and experts and novices, e.g., Novick, 1985). When familiarity
with the source and target domains is not very high but appropriate representations could be achieved
by inference to what is already known, then certain experimental manipulations (e.g., presenting two
instead of one source analogs, giving subjects various hints indicating that the two systems are similar,
increasing the similarity in some descriptive properties of the two analogs, etc.), can bring about
appropriate representations and thus facilitate analogical reasoning.
It becomes apparent from the above discussion that failure to reason by analogy in the cases where an
appropriate representation has not been achieved carries few implications with respect to the ability to
reason analogically per se (i.e., to identify and map a relational structure). The problem in such cases
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may lie not in the analogical mechanism itself (the "analogy engine" as Gentner, in press, calls it), but in
the representational structures on which this mechanism operates.
Lack of concern for children's knowledge about the source and target systems is a common problem in
developmental research on analogical reasoning. When this problem is corrected, the possibility of
discovering that children can reason analogically increases. There is now considerable evidence which
suggests that when children represent the target concepts at the appropriate level of generality, they
can solve four-term analogy problems (Gentner, 1977), understand relational metaphors (Vosniadou,
Ortony, Reynolds & Wilson, 1983), and solve a problem subsequent to listening to a story in which an
analogous problem is solved (Brown, Kane, & Echols, 1986).
The shift from attributes to relations. Recently, Gentner (1987; Gentner & Toupin, 1986) has
advanced the argument that although children do not lack the fundamental competence to make
relational mappings, they do not have the propensity to do so. According to Gentner, "there is a
developmental shift from attributional focus to relational focus in production, choice and rating of
analogy interpretations" (Gentner, in press). This could be due either to lack of knowledge or to lack
of some cognitive ability to observe relational similarity systematically.
Gentner (in press) cites the results of two experiments (Gentner, 1987; Gentner & Toupin, 1986) to
support the attribute to relations shift hypothesis. In Gentner (1987), children and adults were asked to
interpret figurative comparisons of the sort "Clouds are like a sponge." Results showed that the
children produced mainly attributional interpretations (e.g., "both are round and fluffy"), while adults
produced mainly relational interpretations (e.g., "both can hold water and later give it back").
As I have argued elsewhere (Vosniadou, 1987a), there is a confounding of relational interpretation with
lack of necessary knowledge in this experiment. In other words, the information that clouds are round
and fluffy is usually part of children's knowledge about clouds, but the information that clouds hold
water may not be. This criticism applies in general to the materials used. Consider, for example, the
statement "plant stems are like drinking straws." Again, it is highly debatable whether one should
expect a 5-year-old to know that plant stems have liquids running through them, whereas the
knowledge that plant stems are relatively tall and thin is readily available. In order to test the
hypothesis that children do not have the propensity to map relational information one must first ensure
that this information is part of children's knowledge base.
In the second experiment (Gentner & Toupin, 1986), children were asked to act out a story plot twice
using different story characters. One of the variables manipulated was the degree to which the target
objects resembled the source objects. Results showed a strong effect of the transparency of the
character correspondences on transfer accuracy. Transfer accuracy was nearly perfect when highly
similar characters were used and lower when the characters were quite different. Gentner (in press)
concludes that these results provide "a striking demonstration of young children's reliance on surface
similarities in transferring knowledge." However, reliance on surface similarity is not a developmental
phenomenon. Surface similarity enhances analogical access and mapping not only in children but also
in adults (Gentner & Landers, 1985; Ross, in press).
The Ability to Map a Relational Structure
It could be argued that in an analogy comprehension task like Gentner's (1987), the relational structure
does not need to be included in the subject's knowledge of the source. In an analogy comprehension
task the source analog is given explicitly and does not need to be identified (as in four-term verbal
analogies, or even in the case where two analogous stories or problems are provided). All that needs to
be done in this case is map the relevant relational structure from the source to the target. In other
words, the children in Gentner's (1987) experiment could infer that plant stems have liquids running
through them by transferring this information from the source to the target.
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I can think of two responses to this argument. First, similarity statements of the sort "X is like Y" are
ambiguous with respect to whether they should be interpreted as comparisons (in which case the
existing representations of X and Y are compared) or as invitations to transfer information from the
more familiar Y to the less familiar X. Second, even in the case where a mapping is considered, the
mapping may fail for lack of adequate knowledge about which properties of the source could be safely
mapped onto the target. Consider again the statement "plant stems are like drinking straws." It is
possible that there is so much discrepancy between what children think about plant stems and the
possibility that they have liquids running through them, that the mapping of the relevant property of
"drinking straws" is not even considered. A similar mapping difficulty could be experienced by adults,
as in the situation where a physics-naive individual is faced with statements such as "Heat is like water,"
"Particles are like light," and "Electrons are like a spinning top." Mapping an underlying structure may
not necessarily require the presence of this structure in one's current representation of the target, but it
certainly requires that enough is known about the target domain to make such a mapping from the
source feasible.
This argument holds even when the information to be mapped is a simple, descriptive property, rather
than structural information. The case of transfer failure discussed earlier regarding children's
understanding of the statement "the earth is round like a ball," is a good example. The reason why
children have problems with this statement is that their knowledge of the earth is shape (i.e., that the
earth is flat) incompatible with the information that the earth is round. When children (or adults) try
to make sense of such similarity statements, they often end up with gross misconceptions. For
example, many children interpret the "earth is round like a ball" statement to mean that the earth is
circular but flat, like a disc; others believe that people live inside. Finally, some children think that
there are two earths; a round one which is a planet up in the sky, and a flat one on which the people
live (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987a, 1987b)!
If the mapping operation were obstructed by difficulties in mapping relations as opposed to object
attributes the children in our experiments should not have any difficulty understanding that the "earth is
round like a ball." The mapping operation is obstructed because the knowledge of the target concept
contradicts the information which needs to be mapped from the source. When what is known about
the target is consistent with the direction and nature of the required mapping, then the mapping can
take place regardless of whether what is mapped is a descriptive property, a relational property, or an
underlying structure.
Studies of analogy comprehension in our lab (Vosniadou & Ortony, 1983; Vosniadou & Schommer, in
press) show that children readily map a structure from a source analog to a target domain when this
structure is available in their knowledge of the source and is also consistent with what they already
know about the target domain. In these studies children read texts introducing them to relatively
unfamiliar concepts (e.g., an infection) using an explanatory analogy from a more familiar domain (e.g.,
war). Children are asked to recall the texts, to describe the information contained in them to another
child, and to answer various inferential questions about them. Results show that kindergarten and
second grade children are perfectly capable of mapping the relevant structural information from the
source to the target. In other words, they are capable of understanding that in an infection, bacteria
germs attack the body just like in a war, enemy soldiers attack a country.
Most revealing in this experiment are children's inferences. Children often go beyond the information
given to make correct or incorrect inferences about the target domain based on their knowledge of the
source. If children did not have the propensity to make relational mappings, we should expect most of
these inferences to involve the transfer of descriptive properties. Contrary to this prediction, our
results show that descriptive properties are rarely transferred but relational properties often are.
Children do not infer, for example, that white blood cells look like people, wear uniforms or carry guns
when they are told that white blood cells are like soldiers. On the contrary, they often say that white
blood cells can die from an infection, that they feel sorry when they hurt the germs, that they think that
the germs are bad, etc. While many of these mappings are clearly inappropriate, they do demonstrate
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children's propensity to transfer relational information from the source when this information does not
contradict what is already known about the target concept.
In fact, if there is something children could be accused of, it should not be the lack of relational
transfer, but overgeneralization and inappropriate transfer caused by lack of relevant constraints in
their immature knowledge base. The phenomenon of overgeneralization and inappropriate transfer,
common also to adults when using analogies in unfamiliar domains (Halasz & Moran, 1982; Spiro,
Feltovich, Coulson, & Anderson, in press), is particularly characteristic of the thought of the preschool
child, as Chukovsky's (1968) often hilarious examples amply demonstrate.
Finally, the claim that children may have the capacity to make relational mappings but not the
propensity to do so is difficult to accept because the perceptual information for events, for linguistic
structure, and for coordinated action that young children use to make sense of the world around them
is primarily relational. Brown (in press) reviews much of the relevant literature on cognitive
development and makes a persuasive argument for the claim that young children can not only transfer
their knowledge on "deeper bases than mere appearance matches," but also for the primacy of
relational information. The view that infants come predisposed to seek causal explanations and to
uncover potential mechanisms is also a point discussed by Keil (in press).
In ending, it appears that both children and adults can see the similarity in the structure between two
systems, concepts, or stories which are not similar in descriptive properties if their current
representations of these systems already include the relative structures. Both children and adults can
also map a structure from a source to a target system if their knowledge of the target is not inconsistent
with such a mapping.4 What develops is not the ability to engage in analogical reasoning per se, but,
rather, the conceptual system upon which analogical reasoning must operate.
The Ability to Access a Productive Analogy
So far I have emphasized the importance of prior knowledge in analogical access and mapping.
Obviously, it is not possible to identify the structural similarity in two systems if the relevant structure is
not already present in one's representation of these systems. Instructional uses of analogy can augment
and modify one's knowledge about the target system but in these cases the source analog is given, not
discovered. How can an analogy be discovered and also lead to the acquisition of new knowledge,
particularly knowledge about the explanatory structure of a system?
As was argued before, accessing a productive analogy cannot be based on the identification of the
similarity in the structure of two systems. Rather, it must be based on some similarity in easily
accessible properties between the two systems. Once access to a possible analogy has been achieved,
the structure of the source can then be mapped onto the target to solve a problem, answer a generative
question, provide a missing explanatory framework, or restructure the target concept. In the pages that
follow some of these productive uses of analogical reasoning will be explored.
Transferring a structure from a within-domain example. The evidence that adults engage in
analogical reasoning based on surface similarity to a within-domain example is abundant (e.g., see
Anderson & Thompson, in press; and Ross, in press). This is particularly the case when people reason
in unfamiliar domains where they lack general rules. Universal novices, as they are, children lack
general rules and powerful domain-free problem-solving heuristics. As a result, they should be likely to
use similarity-based analogical reasoning to solve problems and deal with everyday situations. Is there
any evidence that children employ this kind of analogical reasoning?
According to Piaget (1962), reasoning on the basis of similarity to particular examples is the main form
of reasoning for young children (2- to 7-year-olds). Here is an example of the kind of reasoning Piaget
observed in his daughter Jacqueline at the age of 2 years and 10 months.
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Obs 111(6) at 2:10(8). J. had a temperature and wanted oranges. It was too early in
the season for oranges to be in the shops and we tried to explain to her that they were
not yet ripe. 'They are still green. We can't eat them. They haven't yet got their
lovely yellow color.' J. seemed to accept this, but a moment later, as she was drinking
her camomile tea, she said, Camomile isn't green, it's yellow already.... Give me some
oranges. (Piaget, 1962, p. 231)
In this example the child uses the camomile as a base from which to reason about oranges. The
reasoning is clear. The child takes camomile as the source from which to reason about oranges,
possibly based on some easily accessible similarity between them (e.g., that they can both be yellow).
The child then maps the explanatory structure of the "when you make camomile tea" to solve the
problem of "when you can eat oranges" (see Table 1). Based on the similarities in this relational
structure the child arrives at the inference that "if camomile has turned yellow, then oranges must have
turned yellow too." And if oranges are yellow, it means that they are ripe and ready to eat, since there
is a particular causal relationship between "yellowness" and "ripeness."
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
According to Piaget (1962), this type of reasoning based on similarity to particular "images" is
characteristic of the preconceptual child and is inferior to both deductive reasoning and analogical
reasoning proper which depend on a stable conceptual system and which develop at the stage of
concrete operations. We now know that this view is not correct. Developmental research has shown
that children are capable of forming consistent and stable classes from an early age and that they can
reason deductively when the necessary knowledge is available (Carey, 1985a; Gelman & Baillargeon,
1983; Rosch, Mervis, Gay, Boyes-Braem, & Johnson, 1976; Smith, 1979; Sugarman, 1979).
Alternatively, unlike Piaget's claims (1962), adults often reason on the basis of similarity to particular
cases as the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1982), Rumelhart and Norman (1981), and Rumelhart
(in press) can easily testify. In fact, the type of reasoning just described is similar to the kind of
analogical reasoning described by Anderson and Thompson (in press), Ross (in press), Kedar-Cabelli
(1985) and Carbonell (1983).
The analogical type of reasoning based on similarity discussed here is different from the probabilistic
type of reasoning based on similarity identified by Carey (1985b). In her experiments, Carey asked
children to decide whether certain animals had unknown properties like "spleens." Children below 10
answered this question by identifying the known spleen owner most similar to the object being probed,
and by deciding whether that object had a spleen or not on the basis of its similarity to the retrieved
exemplar. In the absence of a known causal relation between the existence of spleens and a particular
property or properties of the base, the children in Carey's (1985b) experiments determined the
probability that the target had the property in question (e.g., a spleen) on the basis of the number of
shared similar properties between it and the source exemplar. This type of similarity-based
probabilistic reasoning is similar to the reasoning discussed by Brooks (1978) and Smith and Osherson
(in press). It differs from the similarity-based analogical reasoning discussed here, which involves the
mapping of an explanatory structure. It appears that when there is no explanatory structure to be
mapped, children (and adults) resort to similarity matches and apply some probabilistic reasoning on
them.
Transferring an explanatory structure from a different domain. Adults often borrow an explanatory
framework from a familiar domain in order to reason about a target system where an appropriate
explanatory framework is missing. Presumably this is done on the basis of some similarity in easily
accessible properties of the two systems. It has been shown, for instance, that people borrow a "sand
and grain" model to reason about the behavior of molecules in water (Collins & Gentner, in press), or
describe the workings of a home thermostat in terms of an analogy to a car accelerator (Kempton, in
press). Our investigations of knowledge acquisition in the domain of observational astronomy
(Vosniadou, 1987b; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987a) have shown that not only adults but children are also
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capable of transferring an explanatory framework from a familiar to an unfamiliar domain. One such
example is the use of people as a source analog from which to reason about the movement of the sun
and the moon.
Preschool children have certain observational knowledge of the sun and the moon, but this knowledge
cannot provide an explanatory framework for answering questions like "Where is the sun during the
night?" "Where is the moon during the day?" "How does this happen?" "Why does the sun move?",
etc. In order to answer such "generative" questions, children need to borrow an explanatory framework
from a different domain. Very young children (2-3 year-olds) usually transfer an explanatory
framework from the domain of people. The reason seems to be the sun's and moon's appearance of
self-initiated movement. Because self-initiated movement is a characteristic of animate rather than
inanimate objects, children feel compelled to explain it in ways appropriate to an animate object. They
thus provide psychological explanations of the sun's movement (e.g., the sun hides behind the
mountain, the sun went home to sleep, the sun plays with the moon, etc.), and attribute to the sun (and
moon) certain human-like qualities related to the ability to move independently (i.e., intentionality,
playfulness, fatigue, etc.).
It could be objected here that rather than thinking analogically, young children may simply fail to make
a distinction between animate and inanimate objects. They thus attribute to the sun all the qualities
that an animate object should have (e.g., see Piaget, 1962). This view is not consistent with research
showing that children can observe the animate/inanimate distinction from very early on, (Carey, 1985a;
Gelman, Spelke, & Meck, 1983). It also does not agree with our findings that children attribute to the
sun only those human qualities which are associated with self-initiated movement, and no more. For
example, the same children who say that the sun hides or sleeps to explain the day/night cycle, do not
think that the sun can eat or drink, that it can read newspapers, or that it knows what people do during
the day. Finally, additional evidence for the analogical nature of children's thinking comes from the
fact that some children borrow an explanatory framework from the domain of inanimate objects rather
than the domain of animate objects. These children explain the sun's or the moon's movement to have
been caused by the push of the clouds or by the push of the air.
The type of analogical reasoning just discussed is not qualitatively different from the kind of analogical
reasoning employed by adults when they borrow an explanatory framework from a different domain,
such as the one found in the work of Collins and his colleagues (e.g., Collins & Gentner, in press;
Collins & Stevens, 1984).
Restructuring the Knowledge Base
One of the most significant roles that analogy can play in knowledge acquisition is as a vehicle for
theory change. Analogies have often been cited as mechanisms for theory change in science. This is
particularly the case when dissatisfaction with an existing theory is high and its replacement with a new
theory is actively sought.
It is sometimes difficult to determine whether it is the analogy itself that caused the restructuring or
whether some restructuring of the knowledge base occurred independently and made it possible for the
analogy to be accessed in the first place. One such case is found in Rutherford's planetary analogy of
the atom. The accepted model of the atom before the time of Rutherford was known as the "plum
pudding" model. As the name suggests, according to the "plum pudding" model, the atom consisted of
a positively charged sphere (the "pudding") in which the negatively charged electrons (the "plums")
were embedded (see Figure 1A). Rutherford's experiments showed that instead of being spread
throughout the atom, the positive charge is concentrated in a very small region, or nucleus, at the
center of the atom (see Figure 1B). Once one starts thinking of the positive charge of the atom as
concentrated in a small mass in the center of the atom and the electrons being in the periphery, the
similarity of the atom to the planetary system becomes quite salient. Once accessed, however, the
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adoption of the planetary analogy suggested possibilities about the structure of the atom which might
not have been thought otherwise, thus further aiding the process of theory change.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
In other cases, access to an analogy which can lead to restructuring may be more fortuitous.
Sometimes the perceived similarity in the formal equations used to describe two systems can become
the vehicle for accessing a scientific analogy. In physics, identical equations can be used to describe
fundamentally dissimilar systems. Scientists sometimes come across such similarities accidentally and
it often requires quite a lot of courage to draw the implications of these similarities to their logical
conclusions. One such example is that of DeBroglie's theory of matter-waves. DeBroglie noticed that
Bohr's equations describing the orbits of electrons in an atom were the same equations used to
describe the waves of a violin string. Taking this analogy seriously, he proposed a wave theory of
matter which revolutionized atomic physics and became the foundation of quantum mechanics. Other
examples include the well known similarity in the formal description of electromagnetism and
hydraulics as well as that between a spinning top and the behavior of an electron (spin).
It is possible that children use analogical reasoning to restructure their knowledge base in ways similar
to those of adults. We know that the spontaneous restructuring of the knowledge base does occur in
children (Carey, 1985b; Chi, 1987; Keil, in press; Vosniadou, 1987b). But we still do not know how
such restructurings occur and the role that analogical reasoning may play in them. This is an
interesting area for future research.
Conclusions
The ability to identify within-domain or between-domain analogies and to use them to solve problems
about an unfamiliar target system is present both in adults and in children. It appears that both adults
and children are capable of seeing the structural similarity between two systems when the relevant
structure is part of their representation of these systems. They also seem to be capable of using the
similarity in salient properties between two systems to discover a productive analog. Both adults and
children are knowledgeable about the network of causal relationships that exist between "surface" and
"deep" properties of a system (such as the relationship between "yellowness" and "ripeness," or the
relationship between "self-initiated movement" and "intentionality"), and capable of using the similarity
in some of these properties as a vehicle for discovering an analogy. What develops does not seem to be
the ability to engage in analogical reasoning per se, but the content and organization of the knowledge
base on which analogical reasoning is applied. The richer and more tightly structured one's
representation of a system is, the easier it becomes to see the structural similarities between it and
other systems and the greater the possibility of identifying productive analogs. The developments of
the knowledge base make it possible to access more and more remote analogs, to see the structural
relationships between superficially unrelated systems, and to map increasingly complex structures.
Thus, although critically limited by the information included in the knowledge base, analogical
reasoning can act as a mechanism for enriching, modifying, and radically restructuring the knowledge
base itself.
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Footnotes
11t could be argued that there is a way of turning some seemingly within-category comparisons
into metaphors. For example, the statement "Chicago is the New York of the Midwest" appears to be
metaphorical, although it juxtaposes two items (Chicago and New York) that do not belong to different
conventional categories (both are cities). What is really juxtaposed in this metaphor, however, is not
"Chicago vs. New York" but "cities of the Midwest vs. Cities of the East." This becomes evident if we
consider that the statement "Chicago is New York" is unacceptable. In order to make a metaphor, the
speaker must provide information to the listener about the relevant category which is being violated--in
this case "Chicago as a city of the Midwest" versus "New York as a city of the East."
2he access process for the discovery of productive between domains analogies will be
described in greater detail in future work. It is based on the assumption that in people's conceptual
representations easily accessible properties (which can be either descriptive or relational in nature) are
linked to less accessible ones in complex, causal, explanatory networks, such that the identification of
similarity in one property can lead to the discovery of similarity in other properties and eventually in
the discovery of structural correspondences between the two systems.
3See Michalski (in press) and Barsalou (in press) on what aspects of people's conceptual
knowledge may be profitable to represent at the "base" level of conceptual representations and which at
the "inferential" level.
41 do not mean to argue here that instructional analogies cannot be helpful in restructuring the
knowledge base (see Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987). I think they can, but they cannot do the job of
restructuring on their own. Additional help is required by a teacher who understands the discrepancies
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Figure 1. Models of the Atom.
A: Thompson's "plum pudding" model of the atom
B: Rutherford's "planetary" model of the atom
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